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Abstract
This note shows that there is always a non-empty set of parameter values for
which the hybrid equilibrium in the Besley and Smart(2003) model is unstable in the
sense of Cho and Kreps. This set may include all the parameter values for which
a hybrid equilibrium exists. For these parameter values, it is shown that a fully
separating equilibrium always exists, which is Cho-Kreps stable. In this equilibrium,
the good incumbent distorts scal policy to signal his type. An implication is that
equilibrium in their model is not (generically) unique.
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1. Introduction
In an important recent paper, Besley and Smart(2003) present a rich but simple political
agency model, which they then use to analyze the impact of tax and yardstick competition
on voter welfare. In the model, depending on parameter values, the bad incumbent may
either imitate the good incumbent in order to be re-elected (pooling), or take maximum
rent in the rst period (separating), or randomize between these two alternatives (hybrid).
The hybrid equilibrium plays an important role in their analysis of yardstick competition.
This note shows that there is always a non-empty set of parameter values for which
the hybrid equilibrium in the Besley and Smart model is unstable in the sense of Cho
and Kreps. This set may include all the parameter values for which a hybrid equilibrium
exists. For these parameter values, it is shown that a fully separating equilibrium always
exists. In this equilibrium, when the cost of public good provision is high, the good type
distorts public good provision below the e¢ cient level in order to credibly signal his type.
It is also not that not surprising; often, pooling equilibria are unstable, and in the hybrid
equilibrium, the bad type pools with positive probability.
An implication is that for parameter values where the hybrid equilibrium is unstable,
there are two equilibria in the Besley-Smart model. This result therefore indicates that
Lemma 1 in their paper, which claims uniqueness of equilibrium, is incorrect.
2. Analysis
The notation follows Besley and Smart(2003). The hybrid equilibrium in their model
occurs when s^ = (H   L)GH  (1   )X; and q < 0:5: In that case, the bad incumbent
wants to pool, but if he does so, with probability 1, voters will not wish to re-elect him.
In the hybrid equilibrium, if the voters observe scal policy (GH ; xH) then: (i) voters
re-elect the incumbent with probability  = s^ X
X
; and (ii) the bad incumbent chooses to
pool i.e. play (GH ; xH) in cost state L with probability  = q=(1  q):
Clearly, the hybrid equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Our claim is that
this equilibrium is not stable in the Cho-Kreps sense, under the reasonable assumption
that the good type cares about (discounted) future payo¤s, as does the bad type. We
show this by nding a deviation for the good type which is protable for the good type,
but not protable for the bad type, given that voters infer that the incumbent is good
with probability 1, having observed the deviation.
The key to this protable deviation is that the good type is not re-elected with proba-
bility 1 in the hybrid equilibrium, and this has a second-period cost for him. Specically,
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his equilibrium payo¤ in the hybrid equilibrium, given cost state H; is
U = vH(GH) + U + (1  )[U + (1  )( X)] (2.1)
where v(G) = G   C(G); U = qvH(GH) + (1   q)vL(GL): This is because (i) with
probability ; the good incumbent is re-elected, in which case we (reasonably) assume
that he gets the same expected payo¤ as the voter i.e. U , and (ii) with probability
1   ; the good incumbent is not re-elected, in which case with probability ; he is
replaced by a good challenger, and with probability 1 ; with a bad challenger, in which
case we again (reasonably) assume that he gets the same expected payo¤ as the voter
i.e. U + (1  )( X).
Now consider a deviation from the hybrid equilibrium where in cost state H; the good
incumbent sets G00 = G0   "; x00 = HG00; for some small " > 0; where
(H   L)G0 = (1  )X (2.2)
Equation (2.2), plus " > 0; implies that bad incumbent strictly prefers his hybrid equi-
librium payo¤ of X to the payo¤ from G00; x00; even if he is re-elected with probability 1,
having chosen G00; x00. This is because
(H   L)G00 + X < (H   L)G0 + X = X
So, in the terminology of Cho and Kreps(1987), G00; x00 is equilibrium dominated for the
bad type. So, if G00; x00 is observed, the voters infer that the incumbent is good with
probability 1, and will always re-elect the incumbent.
What is the good types payo¤ from this deviation to G00; x00 in the high-cost state? It
is
U 0 = vH(G00) + U (2.3)
So, the gain to the good type to deviating is
U 0   U = vH(G00)  vH(GH) + U(1  )(1  )X (2.4)
This comprises a rst-period loss from distortion of public good supply, plus a second-
period gain from a higher probability of re-election.
If U 0   U > 0; then we have found a protable deviation for the good type that is
equilibrium dominated for the bad type, and thus the hybrid equilibrium is unstable. But
U 0   U > 0 if
vH(GH)  vH(G00) < U(1  )(1  )X (2.5)
= U(1  )((H   L)GH   (1  )X)
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where in the second line we have used  = (H L)GH X
X
:
Generally, (2.5) will hold when G0 is close to GH : To see this, let G0 = GH  ; where
obviously   0 by the fact that the parameters are such that a hybrid equilibrium exists.
Then, using (2.2), (2.5) becomes
vH(GH)  vH(GH    ") < U(1  )(H   L)
where U(G) = G  C(HG); or
vH(GH)  vH(GH    ")

< U(1  )(H   L) (2.6)
But, for ; " small, as GH maximizes vH :
vH(GH)  vH(GH    ")

= v0H(GH) = 0
So, (2.6) certainly holds for G0 close to GH :
When does it hold for all parameter values for which a hybrid equilibrium exists?
Assuming that C(:) is strictly convex, vH(G) is a strictly concave function of G; so for "
small enough,
vH(GH)  vH(GH    ")

< v0H(0) = 1  C 0(0)
So, if
1  C 0(0) < U(1  )(H   L)
then (2.6) holds globally. If C(Z) = Z2=2; for example, G = 12 ;  = H;L; so v(G) =
1
22
; and this reduces to
1 < [
q
2H2
+
1  q
2L2
](H   L)(1  )
which can certainly hold.
The question then arises, if the hybrid equilibrium is unstable in the Kreps-Cho sense,
is there a stable equilibrium? If the hybrid equilibrium is unstable, the following separat-
ing equilibrium exists and is stable. In the rst period:
- the bad type always separates i.e. chooses scal policy G = 0; x = X:
- if the cost state is low, the good type chooses scal policy GL; xL = LGL :
- if the cost state is high, the good type chooses scal policy G0; x0 = LG0; where G0
is dened in (2.2):
- voters have out-of equilibrium beliefs that the type is bad with probability greater
than 1  (and thus elect the challenger) if they observe any out-of-equilibrium rst-period
scal policy.
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This is clearly a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. First, when the cost state is high, the
good type does not wish to deviate to any other scal policy combination than G0; x0
because such a deviation gives him a payo¤ at most
U 00 = vH(GH) + [U + (1  )( X)] (2.7)
because he loses the subsequent election. But by inspection of (2.7) and (2.1), U 00 is
strictly less than U; which is in turn less than the equilibrium payo¤ of U 0 in (2.3).
Second, when the cost state is high, the bad type is indi¤erent between his equilibrium
choice (0; X) and imitating the good type. Finally, the equilibrium is Cho-Kreps stable
by construction.
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